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Introduction and summary
This report explores some of the most financially disadvantaged school districts in 
the country and identifies a typology of conditions that have created or reinforced 
their disadvantage. Financially disadvantaged districts are those that serve student 
populations with much greater-than-average need but do so with much less-than-
average funding. The Education Law Center of New Jersey’s annual report, “Is 
School Funding Fair? A National Report Card,” uses a panel of the most recent 
three years of U.S. Census Bureau Fiscal Survey data on state and local revenues 
per pupil in order to determine which states achieve systematically greater funding 
per pupil in districts serving higher student poverty concentrations and which 
states maintain school funding systems where higher poverty districts have sys-
tematically fewer resources per pupil.1
The same data have been used in follow-up analyses to identify the local public 
school districts across states that are saddled with greater-than-average student 
needs and less-than-average state and local revenue.2 As one might expect, 
numerous poorly funded local public school districts exist in the least fairly 
funded states. That is, where a state school finance system is such that higher-need 
districts on average have lower state and local revenue, there tends to be more 
high-need districts with lower state and local revenue. And as it turns out, there 
are unfairly funded districts in what are traditionally viewed as fairly funded states. 
In other words, poorly funded local public school districts exist in states where 
school finance systems are, on average, progressive. This report looks at why this 
happens—and what can be done about it.
First, this report lays out a typology of conditions that lead to severe fiscal disadvan-
tage for local public school systems. It then provides examples of states, state policy 
conditions, and specific local public school districts identified as being severely 
financially disadvantaged. The causes of fiscal disadvantage are classified as follows: 
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• Type 1. Savage inequalities: How persistent disparities in local taxable property 
wealth continue to undermine equity in American education
• Type 2. Stealth inequalities: How dysfunctional, poorly designed, state school 
finance formulas fail to correct, and sometimes reinforce, disparities 
• Type 3. Some politics is still local: How local tax policy and budgeting decisions 
may undermine state equity objectives 
• Type 4. Not-so-blurred lines: How small, segregated enclaves embedded in 
population-dense metropolitan areas reinforce fiscal disparities 
• Type 5. Shift happens: How the changing demography of exurban and smaller-
city America leads to emerging fiscal disadvantage 
The report concludes by providing policy recommendations. Approaches to 
reforming aid should address the following issues: 
• Organizational concerns. America’s public school districts remain highly 
geographically, demographically, and economically segregated. As long as this 
continues, leveraging state school finance policies as part of the solution to 
achievement gaps will be an uphill battle. 
• State policy leverage over local fiscal decisions. The power of state school 
finance systems to resolve inequities in funding across local districts is limited. 
Local district and municipal taxing and spending decisions can—and, in many 
cases, do—undermine state school finance policy objectives.
• More-nuanced measures of local capacity and need in state aid formulas. 
The cases explored in this paper reveal some additional complexities to the 
economics and demography of local public school districts that likely require 
a closer look to determine the best methods for combining state aid and local 
revenues to overall adequate spending. Such policies could substantively 
improve equity in both taxation and the raising of revenue across communities 
that have disparate access to nonresidential tax bases without requiring them to 
raise and spend additional state aid. 
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• Illogical state aid programs. States must take a hard look at plainly illogical state 
school finance formulas. Clearly, Michigan and Arizona need to revisit their gen-
eral state aid formulas so as to allocate more of their existing aid to districts with 
greater needs, which will mean allocating less aid to districts with fewer needs. 
While substantively resolving any one of these problems would move the ball 
forward on equity, definitively resolving all four is required for making consistent 
progress across all states and local public school districts. Resolving these persis-
tent disparities between districts remains a prerequisite condition for resolving 
internal disparities in the most fiscally deprived school districts. Doing so also 
serves as a prerequisite condition to resolve disparities in essential resources, 
including teaching quality, class sizes, and access to deep and broad curricular 
opportunities for all children regardless of the school or district they attend. 
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Background
There have long been clear and large funding disparities in education. These occur 
when general state aid formulas fail by simply providing too little state aid to 
improve equity. Typically, funding disparities are caused by disparities in taxable 
property wealth, a primary source of local revenue that rears its ugly head in the 
form of substantial variation in local revenues raised by school districts and leads 
to substantial variation in total revenues. These disparities are what one might 
refer to as classic, or savage, inequalities, wherein rich neighborhoods have well-
funded schools and poor neighborhoods have poorly funded schools. 
A previous Center for American Progress report, “The Stealth Inequalities of 
School Funding: How State and Local School Finance Systems Perpetuate 
Inequitable Student Spending,” noted that in several states, property tax revenue 
disparities remain the dominant contributor to local revenue disparities in states 
with the worst total funding disparities. In New Hampshire, for example, property 
tax revenue disparities explain 98 percent of local revenue disparities; and in large, 
diverse states such as Pennsylvania, New York, and Illinois, property tax revenue 
disparities explain about 92 percent of local revenue disparities.3 
But these savage inequalities—a term first used by writer Jonathan Kozol4—are 
only part of the story. State school finance systems are purportedly designed to 
address both differences in student needs across districts and differences in local 
fiscal capacity to meet those needs.5 In some cases, states simply fail to put up 
sufficient support to accommodate either or both; in other cases, states create aid 
formulas that measure imprecisely or inaccurately one, the other, or both—lead-
ing to some comparably needy districts being less well-funded than others. In the 
worst cases, states allocate the majority of their aid with little or no sensitivity to 
either local district need or capacity. 
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Elsewhere, state school finance systems have evolved to provide lumpy and unpre-
dictable allocations, including through many categorical aid programs intended 
to provide additional need-based funding for some locations but not others that 
seem comparably needy.6 These categorical programs are often ill-planned and 
poorly integrated with general aid formulas, and they may evolve into an illogical 
patchwork that does as much to undermine equity objectives as it does to advance 
them. In Connecticut, for example, the cities of Hartford and New Haven receive 
substantial aid to support magnet school programs, but other smaller cities with 
very high need, including Waterbury and New Britain, are left out. 
Local and intermediate government financial decisions can also thwart state 
school finance system objectives. State laws vary with respect to the extent that 
states regulate local tax and spending behavior, and the success that state school 
finance systems have at achieving equity objectives depends on how well state 
aid blends with local resources. Thus, local taxing and spending decisions can 
substantially undermine equity. Districts may fall below formula-calculated 
funding levels because of local government failure to levy sufficient local taxes to 
support the school system or, in cases where local public school districts depend 
on municipal budgeting, the failure of municipal government to provide sufficient 
support for schools. 
Additionally, the complex demography and geography of states and the orga-
nization of local public school district boundaries pose challenges to ensuring 
all districts and the children they educate have equitable funding levels. Several 
population-dense metropolitan areas in the United States remain carved into a 
racially and economically segregated mosaic of local public school districts, which 
in some cases enroll only a few hundred students7 and lie immediately adjacent to 
other tiny local public school districts that can seem a world away. 
Beyond more common patterns of metropolitan disparity, small cities and larger 
towns at the outer fringes of and beyond major metropolitan areas often appear 
left out of state school finance systems; these disparities are due perhaps in part to 
having less political leverage than larger cities but also because their local tax bases 
typically lack the higher value that the commercial and industrial tax bases of 
larger cities—and the residential value that the wealthy suburbs—have. Small cit-
ies and large towns in many states, including Reading, Pennsylvania; Dodge City, 
Kansas; and Lexington, Nebraska, have experienced dramatic demographic shifts 
in recent decades, as Hispanic immigration in particular has rapidly increased. 
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There’s another important issue here—the nature of school governance. School 
governance has been described as a “layer cake” by some because our system of 
financing public education involves three layers—federal, state, and local—of 
geography, tax policy, revenue raising, and spending controls, and the adverse con-
sequences are many. As is discussed below, district boundaries play a major role in 
reinforcing funding inequities. Stories behind the establishment of these boundar-
ies and the use of the space within them range from the organization of commu-
nities divided by natural barriers such as rivers, lakes, and mountains to divisive, 
racially motivated urban planning and gerrymandering. The entire cake is built on 
this least equitable bottom layer of local jurisdictions, which are funded largely by 
local property taxes. Furthermore, affluent local jurisdictions likely wield dispro-
portionate influence on the layers above, at times winning some extra frosting. 
But the ground-up nature of our school system is not all bad. Even the much-
maligned local property tax has its virtues. Most notably, property tax revenues 
have remained a relatively stable counterbalance8 to ever-volatile state income tax 
revenues over the years.9 The bottom layer of the cake, while irreparably uneven, 
is at least relatively stable. Policymakers may seek to either compensate for the 
problems that emerge from our layered system of local and state finance or dis-
rupt its underlying features.
Currently, states’ general equalization aid to schools, tax and expenditure limits, 
and federal targeted aid are largely compensatory, operating against the constraints 
of a system designed around centuries of unequal urban development. Targeted 
program interventions in lower-income communities, including reduced class 
sizes, fully funded early childhood programs, and teacher recruitment and reten-
tion incentives, are also compensatory. Disrupting the boundaries that reinforce 
inequality and thwart these compensatory policies is a very difficult task. School 
choice programs, which have the potential to create diffusion across boundaries, 
are often relegated to operate within existing boundaries, meaning that highly and 
less-disadvantaged schools are little more than sorted. State policies seeking to 
reduce mobility barriers across district lines face an uphill battle to gain suburban 
support.10 Interdistrict choice programs have remained limited, though recent 
court rulings regarding Missouri’s choice program may push those boundaries.11 
State incentives to promote consolidation among even subtly different neighbor-
ing districts face a similar uphill political battle.12 
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Nevertheless, having the conversation is better than remaining silent, and consid-
ering the costs and benefits of policies that attempt to compensate for persistent 
disparities versus those that may disrupt its underlying causes is worthwhile. 
In the end, the issue does not simply revolve around money, and we need to do 
more than work around structural issues to ensure that all students have a fair 
shot at a good education. 
Methodological note
Fiscally disadvantaged districts are those with higher-than-average student needs 
for their labor-market location and lower-than-average resources when state and 
local revenues are combined. Illinois and Pennsylvania persist in having what 
are among the worst savage inequalities. As a result, the cities of Chicago and 
Philadelphia are, year after year, the two most fiscally disadvantaged large urban 
districts in the nation. 
Table 1 summarizes the report’s typology and lists the exemplars discussed 
in later sections. Relative poverty ratios indicate the districts’ Census poverty 
rates compared to the average for districts in the same labor market, and relative 
revenues indicate the districts’ state and local revenues per pupil relative to the 
average for districts in the same labor market. As shown, Reading and Allentown, 
Pennsylvania, face the most extreme conditions, with nearly 2.5 times the area pov-
erty rates and less than 80 percent of the average state and local revenue per pupil. 
It is important to understand that the value of any given level of education fund-
ing, in any given location, is relative. That is, it does not matter whether a district 
spends $10,000 per pupil or $20,000 per pupil. It matters how that funding 
compares to other districts operating in the same regional labor market—and, for 
that matter, how that money relates to other conditions in the regional labor mar-
ket. The first reason relative funding matters is that schooling is labor intensive. 
The quality of schooling depends largely on the ability of schools or districts to 
recruit and retain quality employees. The largest share of school districts’ annual 
operating budgets is tied up in the salaries and wages of teachers and other school 
workers. The ability to recruit and retain teachers in a school district in any given 
labor market depends on the wage a district can pay to teachers relative to other 
surrounding schools or districts and relative to nonteaching alternatives in the 
same labor market.13 The second reason is that graduates’ access to opportunities 
beyond high school is largely relative and regional. The ability of graduates of one 
school district to gain access to higher education or the labor force depends on the 
regional pool in which the graduate must compete.14 
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Methods for identifying fiscally disadvantaged districts are provided in Appendix 
A, and full lists of fiscally disadvantaged districts can be found in Appendix B. 
Complete lists of considered cities, suburbs, and towns can be found in Appendix C. 
TABLE 1
Report typology and exemplar states
Typology
Exemplar  
states
Severely 
disadvantaged 
districts
Relative
poverty
Relative
revenue
Type 1. Savage, inequalities Illinois
Pennsylvania
Chicago, IL
Philadelphia, PA 
Reading, PA 
Allentown, PA
1.660
2.131
2.316
2.454
0.868
0.879
0.795
0.777
Type 2. Stealth inequalities Michigan
Arizona
Hamtramck, MI
East Detroit, MI 
Clintondale, MI
Sunnyside, AZ
2.099
2.062
1.906
1.646
0.803
0.876
0.869
0.800
Type 3. Some politics is still local Connecticut Bridgeport, CT 2.618 0.802
Type 4. Not-so-blurred lines Illinois
Arizona
[elementary 
districts]
Posen-Robbins Elem, IL
Lincoln Elem, IL
Glendale Elem, AZ
Alhambra Elem, AZ
1.748
1.713
1.574
1.964
0.687
0.747
0.770
0.795
Type 5. Shift happens Illinois
Pennsylvania
Waukegan, IL
Aurora East, IL
Round Lake, IL
Reading, PA
Allentown, PA
2.175
1.416
1.966
2.316
2.454
0.786
0.782
0.769
0.795
0.777
Source: See Appendix A.
Exemplars of extreme fiscal disadvantage
This section first discusses the savage inequalities that currently exist in Illinois 
and Pennsylvania. While local taxation decisions play some role in increasing 
disparities, districts disadvantaged by savage inequalities really have no way to 
dig themselves out, no matter how high they might try to tax themselves. It then 
illustrates the role of state aid in reinforcing, or at the very least doing little to 
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correct, disparities in Michigan and Arizona, before exploring the more nuanced 
and complicated case of local budgeting undermining the financial condition of 
Bridgeport, Connecticut, schools and displaying the problems associated with 
extreme school district segregation in Chicago and Phoenix. Finally, it looks at the 
plight of predominantly Hispanic districts in Illinois and Pennsylvania. 
TABLE 2
Type 1. Savage inequalities
How disparities in local property wealth undermine equity in American education
Typology Exemplar states
Severely 
disadvantaged 
districts
Relative
poverty
Relative
revenue
Type 1. 
Savage  
inequalities
Illinois
Pennsylvania
Other contenders: New York
Chicago, IL
Philadelphia, PA 
Reading, PA 
Allentown, PA
Utica, NY
1.660
2.131
2.316
2.454
1.826
0.868
0.879
0.795
0.777
0.836
Source: See Appendix A.
Savage inequalities are characterized by affluent suburbs with big houses on tree-
lined streets, palatial high schools, top-notch lacrosse and fencing teams, and elite 
orchestras contrasted with nearby urban ghettos replete with overcrowded and 
crumbling schools, high crime and considerable dropout rates. Sadly, this carica-
ture of American education persists as a stark reality in many parts of the country. 
It is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in the Philadelphia and Chicago 
metropolitan areas. 
Figure 1 displays a classic spatial pattern of inequality. Chicago, Illinois, has rela-
tively low per-pupil revenue but is surrounded by leafy suburbs with high-spend-
ing public school systems. Background shading indicates state and local revenue 
per pupil of school districts. Circles indicate schools with shares of low-income 
children indicated by the circle’s color. Savage disparities such as those in the 
Chicago metropolitan area are represented by red circles on yellow-to-red back-
grounds adjacent to blue circles on blue backgrounds.
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The city of Chicago is shaded yellow for revenue, highlighting its large numbers of 
very high-poverty schools. The leafy suburbs have both very high spending and low-
poverty schools. To the south of Chicago are additional modest to poorly funded 
districts with very high-poverty schools. Two additional high-poverty districts with 
particularly low revenue appear to the north and west—Waukegan and Round Lake. 
Percent free lunch
0 to 20%
21 to 40%
41 to 60%
61 to 80%
81 to 100%
Non-Unified 
elementary districts
State and local revenue per pupil
$6,483.92 - $9,444.95
$9,444.96 - $10,934.11
$10,934.12 - $12,668.43
$12,668.44 - $14,866.67
$14,866.68 - $18,259.74
$18,259.75 - $22,889.91
$22,889.92 - $34,700.51
FIGURE 1
Distribution of state and local revenue by district and low-income students by school in Illinois
Sources: State and local revenue data from U.S. Census Bureau’s Fiscal Survey of Local Governments (F-33) at Bureau of the Census, Public School Finance Data: Public Elementary—Secondary 
Education Finance Data (U.S. Department of Commerce), available at http://www.census.gov/govs/school/; School-level rates of children qualied for free lunch as well as latitude and longitude 
locations of schools from National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data: Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey 2010–11 (U.S. Department of Education), available 
at http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/pubschuniv.asp); Geographic Information Systems shapeles for school district boundaries available from U.S. Census Bureau, available for download either at National 
Center for Education Statistics, “School District Demographics System,” available at http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sdds/ed/index.asp (last accessed March 2014) or directly at Bureau of the Census, 
“2013 TIGER/Line Shapeles,” available at http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/geo/shapeles2013/main (last accessed March 2014).
Waukegan
Chicago
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The larger areas shaded in blue actually conceal additional disparities among the 
many smaller elementary school districts that serve smaller neighborhood areas. 
Figure 1 displays revenue aggregated across collections of nonunified elementary 
and secondary school districts, but additional and substantial disparities exist across 
the underlying elementary districts due to their independent local taxing authority.
Figure 2 illustrates the extremes of fiscal disparity in the Chicago metropolitan 
area, the root of which can be found in disparities in access to local property 
wealth. Property tax revenues per child in affluent high schools or unified districts 
far outpace those of poorer districts. Furthermore, state aid levels barely make a 
dent in these disparities. The relative position of the city of Chicago is strength-
ened only by the fact that it possesses a stronger local property tax base than out-
lying low-income districts, such as Round Lake, Waukegan, or even inner-urban 
fringe districts on the South Side of Chicago. 
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$15,000
$20,000
$25,000
FIGURE 2
Revenue decomposition (2009-11) of advantaged 
and disadvantaged school districts in Illinois.
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau Fiscal Survey of Local Governments (http://www.census.gov/govs/school/) & U.S. Census Small Area 
Income and Poverty Estimates (https://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/data/schools/data/index.html
City of
Chicago
Round 
Lake CUSD
Waukegan Deerfield Lake
Forest
New Trier
HSD
Evanston
HSD
High poverty/Low spending Low poverty/High spending
State general aid
Local charges/other
Local tuition/transfers
Local property tax
State special aid
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Figure 3 displays the variations in operating tax 
levies in relation to operating expenses per pupil 
for the 2011-12 school year. What the figure 
shows generally is that while significant variation 
exists in operating tax levies, higher tax levies are 
not necessarily associated with higher spend-
ing—whether state, local, or federal sources. 
Affluent high school districts have especially 
low operating levies but very high spending per 
pupil. Elementary districts in the same locations 
also have below-average operating levies and 
relatively high per-pupil spending. The City of 
Chicago Public Schools levies comparable taxes 
but comes in slightly below elementary district 
spending for affluent suburbs. 
In Figure 3, Waukegan is represented as having 
a very high local tax levy and relatively high 
spending. But prior years of data from federal 
sources indicate that Waukegan’s state and local 
revenue per pupil is much lower. Round Lake 
has a relatively high local tax levy and relatively low spending; it has more than 
double the tax rates of the New Trier, Evanston, and Lake Forest High School 
Districts but less than half the per-pupil spending. 
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FIGURE 3
Illinois tax rates and spending per pupil
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Source: Illinois Department of Education 2011-12.  Operating Tax Rate from 2010. 
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FIGURE 4
Distribution of state and local revenue by district and low-income students by school in Pennsylvania
Percent free lunch
0 to 20%
21 to 40%
41 to 60%
61 to 80%
81 to 100%
State and local revenue per pupil
$9,037.84 - $10,924.09
$10,924.10 - $12,142.68
$12,142.69 - $13,431.95
$13,431.96 - $14,966.18
$14,966.19 - $17,411.67
$17,411.68 - $22,303.40
$22,303.41 - $31,982.97Sources: Bureau of the Census; National Center for Education Statistics.
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Pennsylvania reveals a pattern of savage 
inequalities rivaled only by that of Illinois. As 
can be seen in Figure 4, Philadelphia schools—
like Chicago schools—are almost uniformly 
high in poverty concentration, while district 
per-pupil revenue is low by comparison to 
surroundings. Quite possibly, the nation’s 
most fiscally disadvantaged local public school 
districts of significant size lie to the north and 
west of Philadelphia, in the districts of Reading 
and Allentown. These districts sit at the bottom 
of the revenue distribution and serve very high-
need student populations. 
Figure 5 shows the relationship in Pennsylvania 
between local property tax rates and current 
spending per pupil. On average, districts with 
higher tax rates do tend to have higher per-pupil 
spending. But regardless of their tax rates, some 
districts—including Reading, Allentown, and 
Philadelphia—are highly unlikely to rise to the 
top in spending. They simply cannot generate 
the local revenue. Philadelphia’s local property 
tax rates are relatively average, but its spending 
for its metropolitan area is low. Reading’s local property tax rate is actually quite 
high, yet as evidenced in Figure 4, it can hardly generate sufficient local revenue 
per pupil. Meanwhile, Radnor and Lower Merion have relatively low local prop-
erty tax rates and, despite receiving very little state aid, manage to substantially 
outspend most districts in the state. 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
$5
$10
$15
$20
$25
$30
$35
$40
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 p
er
 p
up
il 
(in
 th
ou
sa
nd
s)
FIGURE 5
Pennsylvania tax rates and spending per pupil
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Source: Mill rate data; per-pupil spending data from Pennsylvania Department of Education, available 
at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/http;//www.portal.state.pa.us;80/portal/server.pt/gateway/
PTARGS_0_123706_1335925_0_0_18/Finances%20AFR%20ExpDetail%200102-1112.xlsx; Equalized mill 
rate data from Pennsylvania Department of Education, available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/
http;//www.portal.state.pa.us;80/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_123706_1285614_0_0_18/
Finances%20SelectedData%202010-2011.xlsx.
Mill levy
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TABLE 3
Type 2. Stealth inequalities
How dysfunctional state school finance formulas do not help and sometimes hurt
Typology
Exemplar  
states
Severely 
disadvantaged 
districts
Relative
poverty
Relative
revenue
Type 2.  
Stealth  
inequalities
Michigan
Arizona
Hamtramck, MI
East Detroit, MI 
Clintondale, MI
Sunnyside, AZ
2.099
2.062
1.906
1.646
0.803
0.876
0.869
0.800
Source: See Appendix A.
In some states, state aid plays a much greater role in financing local public school 
districts, but even larger shares of such funding do little to advance equity or 
accommodate student needs. Michigan and Arizona are two egregious examples. 
Figure 6 conveys the pattern of revenue disparities for Michigan school districts. 
Since the early 1990s, Michigan has been touted as a model of state school finance 
reform, attempting to dramatically reduce—and, originally, to entirely elimi-
nate—the role of property taxes for school funding and promising to pay the bulk 
of education costs through a statewide formula. The promise of Michigan’s school 
finance reforms was never realized, largely because the state found that it could 
not raise sufficient revenue from other tax sources to provide adequate funding for 
all districts.15 Instead of rethinking the original plan and better targeting the rev-
enue that was raised to the districts that needed it most, however, the state moved 
forward with a plan that continued to flatly allocate aid regardless of need or local 
capacity to supplement. 
Figure 6 reveals that the primary source of disparities in total revenues per pupil 
between fiscally disadvantaged and advantaged districts remains different in local 
property tax revenues. Instead of remedying these disparities, however, Michigan’s 
school finance reforms simply layer relatively constant shares of state general aid 
on top of them. It seems foolish and wasteful, much like other stealth inequalities 
identified in the previously mentioned CAP paper, “The Stealth Inequalities of 
School Funding,” to provide thousands of dollars per pupil in state aid to districts 
such as Bloomfield Hills and Gross Point while others, such as Hamtrack, East 
Detroit, and Clintondale, are only able to raise and spend half as much.
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Figure 7 displays the revenue breakdown for 
disadvantaged and advantaged Arizona school 
districts. Clearly, the largest disparities are cre-
ated by differences in access to local property 
wealth. Property tax revenues per pupil are 
several times higher in low-poverty, high-
spending districts than in high-poverty, low-
spending ones. But a notable feature of Figure 
7 is that despite the fact that the low-poverty, 
high-spending districts raise more than three 
times as much money in local revenue, they 
still receive significant state aid per pupil. 
Much like general state aid in Michigan, state 
aid in Arizona could be allocated far more 
equitably to eliminate property-wealth-related 
disparities in revenues. 
FIGURE 6
Revenue decomposition (2009–11) of advantaged 
and disadvantaged school districts in Michigan
$0
$5,000
$10,000
$15,000
$20,000
Hamtramck
Low poverty/High spending
East 
Detroit
Clintondale Bloomfield 
Hills
Grosse Point
High poverty/Low spending
Local charges/other
Local intergovernmental
State general aid
Local Tuiton/transfers
Local property tax
State special aid
Source: See Appendix A.
FIGURE 7
Revenue decomposition (2009–11) of advantaged 
and disadvantaged school districts in Arizona
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Source: See Appendix A.
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TABLE 4
Type 3. Stealth inequalities
How dysfunctional state school finance formulas do not help and sometimes hurt
Typology
Exemplar  
states
Severely 
disadvantaged 
districts
Relative
poverty
Relative
revenue
Type 3.  
Some politics  
is still local 
Connecticut
Other contenders: 
Rhode Island 
Bridgeport, CT 
Woonsocket, RI
2.618 
2.035
0.802 
0.776
Source: See Appendix A.
The revenue breakdown analysis in the previous figures reveals that disparities 
in local revenues continue to play a significant role in determining which local 
public school districts remain most fiscally disadvantaged. Local tax revenues 
per pupil depend on the strength of the tax base per pupil and the tax rate levied 
on those properties. As shown previously, variations in local tax rates can lead to 
additional disparities. 
While states often hold the constitutional responsibility for ensuring equitable and 
adequate financing of local public school systems, municipalities and local commu-
nities still retain control over where they set their local property tax rates in many 
states. Definitions of property types and methods of property valuation, as well 
as mechanisms for determining tax rates, are often established in state statutes or 
constitutions. Furthermore, many states set caps on either total tax rates, revenue to 
be generated from local taxes, or growth in property tax rates or revenues.16 
Yet even with these controls, states have not been able to fully overcome dispari-
ties in local district revenues caused by variations in local tax and budgeting poli-
cies. State school finance systems often base their aid calculations on assumptions 
of equal or fair local taxation, but these same systems do not always require local 
public districts to actually raise their local fair share or their parent municipalities 
to spend the equivalent of the local fair share on schools. Beyond providing only 
soft minimum local taxing requirements, many states permit wide variation above 
and beyond minimum requirements. In some cases, states adopt controls such as 
tax and spending limits, which serve to codify current disparities by, for example, 
limiting future growth in tax levies but starting from and proportionately building 
on an inequitable baseline. A constant tension exists between state aid formulas 
and local taxing and spending decisions. 
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Figure 8 shows southwestern Connecticut, which contains two of the state’s 
persistently most fiscally disadvantaged districts: Waterbury and Bridgeport. Both 
are shaded orange, indicating relatively low—but not the lowest—state and local 
revenue per pupil. There are certainly lower revenue districts in the state, but as 
can be seen in the figure, many of the lower revenue districts also serve fewer poor 
children. Each of the three fiscally disadvantaged districts in the area includes 
numerous high-poverty schools.
Another peculiar feature of Connecticut is the other districts that are home to 
high-poverty schools with higher expenditure levels—notably New Haven, in 
light blue to the east of Bridgeport, and Hartford, in light blue to the northeast 
of New Britain. A significant share of the additional funding in these districts 
involves state aid targeted to magnet programs. 
State and local revenue per pupil
$10,632.71 - $13,117.21
$13,117.22 - $14,722.82
$14,722.83 - $16,177.46
$16,177.47 - $17,784.23
$17,784.24 - $19,916.08
$19,916.09 - $23,957.04
$23,957.05 - $29,304.35
Percent free lunch
0 to 20%
21 to 40%
41 to 60%
61 to 80%
81 to 100%Sources: Bureau of the Census; National Center for Education Statistics.
FIGURE 8
Distribution of state and local revenue by district and low-income students by school in Connecticut
Hartford
New Britain
Waterbury
New Haven
Bridgeport
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Table 2 explores spending variations induced by local tax policy among high-
poverty urban Connecticut districts. It uses data from the municipal financial 
reporting system of the state of Connecticut to parse more precisely municipal 
revenues, municipal expenditures, and state aid across these cities. Table 2 shows 
that the Net Current Expenditures per Pupil in Average Daily Membership, 
or NCE/ADM, are significantly higher in Hartford and New Haven than in 
Bridgeport and Waterbury. 
Looking at municipal revenue as a whole, it would appear that intergovernmental 
revenues—state aid to the municipalities and perhaps some county revenues—are 
higher in Hartford and New Haven; this may include magnet school aid. As shown 
in the taxes column, total taxes collected per capita are actually quite comparable, 
with Hartford being marginally higher. Thus, intergovernmental transfers seem to 
explain the difference in total local revenue per capita.
But in a state with fiscally dependent school districts, total municipal revenue dif-
ferences per capita do not necessarily translate to school revenues per child. City 
governments make spending decisions across their public services and may or 
may not favor their public school systems. Looking at expenditures in the bottom 
section of Table 2, we see that municipal expenditures on education per pupil 
are comparable between Bridgeport and New Haven, lowest in Waterbury, and 
highest in Hartford. 
Furthermore, the percent of total spending allocated to schools varies widely, 
with the highest percent allocated to Hartford. Unexplained by Table 2 is how 
New Haven ultimately has per-pupil expenditures more comparable to Hartford 
than to the other disadvantaged cities. Its tax collections are low, and its share of 
total expenditures allocated to schools is the lowest. Intergovernmental transfers 
are higher for New Haven than for Bridgeport or Waterbury, but not by much. 
Nonetheless, it is readily apparent that a multitude of decisions can substantially 
influence local school funding disparities that in turn affect total available rev-
enues in ways currently beyond the direct control of state school finance policies. 
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TABLE 5
Fiscal profiles of select Connecticut cities
Bridgeport Waterbury Hartford New Haven 
2011 population 145,638 110,189 124,867 129,585
School district net current expenditures
NCE 2010-11 $281,873,864 $256,533,397 $379,784,614 $326,302,162
ADM 2010-11 20,949 17,594 20,985 17,720
NCE/ADM (current spending per pupil) $13,455 $14,581 $18,098 $18,414
Revenue
Intergovernmental revenue $207,535,677 $153,659,000 $272,915,000 $227,634,807
Intergovernmental revenue  
per capita
$1,425 $1,395 $2,186 $1,757
Tax revenue (municipal) $272,206,146 $218,483,000 $274,013,000 $218,720,737
Total revenue $500,218,709 $391,619,000 $562,686,000 $485,922,103
Total revenue per capita $3,435 $3,554 $4,506 $3,750
Taxes
Mill rate 39.65 41.82 72.79 43.90
Equalized net grand list  
(taxable property wealth)
$9,790,215,961 $7,056,499,043 $7,713,607,784 $7,748,069,515
EGL/population $67,223 $64,040 $61,775 $59,791
Total taxes collected $269,003,160 $215,843,000 $263,161,000 $216,276,372
Collection rate (compliance) 87.6% 92.2% 88.9% 96.2%
Collections per capita $1,847 $1,959 $2,108 $1,669
Expenditures (municipal)
Total expenditures $500,020,343 $343,602,000 $523,968,000 $490,946,113
Education $229,559,379 $168,429,000 $304,370,000 $193,103,792
Education expenditures  
per pupil (municipal)
$10,958 $9,573 $14,504 $10,897
Education share 45.9% 49.0% 58.1% 39.3%
Source: Data from 2012 Connecticut Fiscal Indicators database, available at http://www.dir.ct.gov/opm/IGP/munfinsr/FI2008-12V2000.mdb. 
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TABLE 6
Type 4. Not-so-blurred lines of segregation
How small, segregated enclaves in densely populated areas reinforce fiscal disparities
Typology Exemplar states
Severely 
disadvantaged 
districts
Relative
poverty
Relative
revenue
Type 4.  
Not-so-blurred lines
Illinois
Arizona
[elementary districts]
Posen-Robbins Elem, IL
Lincoln Elem, IL
Glendale Elem, AZ
Alhambra Elem, AZ
1.748
1.713
1.574
1.964
0.687
0.747
0.770
0.795
Source: See Appendix A.
Despite substantial reductions in the number of local public school districts 
nationwide over the past several decades, some states and metropolitan areas still 
have large numbers of holdouts, including large numbers of nonunified elemen-
tary and high school districts that are highly racially and economically segre-
gated.17 This carving up of diverse metropolitan areas into tiny segregated enclaves 
exacerbates disparities between districts. 
Figure 9 shows the area of Phoenix, Arizona, which includes a diverse mix of 
schools by low-income concentration overlaying that have significant revenue 
variation. The figure shows the aggregated variation in revenues for high school 
districts. But this aggregation masks substantial variation in resources across 
underlying nonunified elementary school districts. The area identified as Glendale 
Elementary School District has a high concentration of high-poverty schools and 
is part of a diverse, relatively low-revenue, consolidated high school district. 
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Figure 10 displays the variation in per-pupil spending across underlying elemen-
tary districts. Glendale, in particular, has very low per-pupil spending and very 
high relative poverty. Recall from Table 1 that Glendale has 1.57 times the area 
poverty rate and 77 percent of the area’s average state and local revenue. Alhambra 
is in a worse position in terms of poverty, at 1.96 times the metropolitan area aver-
age, and an only slightly better position in terms of revenue, with 79.5 percent of 
the metropolitan area average. 
Percent free lunch
0 to 20%
21% to 40%
41% to 60%
61% to 80%
80% to 100%
State and local 
revenue per pupil
$3,858.39 - $6,393.06
$6,393.07 - $7,795.76
$7,795.77 - $9,686.81
$9,686.82 - $12,257.14
$12,257.15 - $16,593.02
$16,593.03 - $24,840.91
$24,840.92 - $43,857.14
FIGURE 9
Distribution of state and local revenue by district and low-income students by school in Arizona
Sources: Bureau of the Census; National Center for Education Statistics.
Glendale Elementary
District
Scottsdale
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Recall from Table 1 that the city of Chicago had 1.66 times its metropolitan area 
poverty rate and 86.8 percent of the average state and local revenue per pupil. As 
with the Arizona maps, the previous Chicago metropolitan area map (see Figure 
1) masked underlying elementary district disparities. Figure 11 uncovers these 
disparities. While there are many to choose from, the Posen-Robbins School 
District 143½ and Lincoln Elementary District 156 both have greater than 1.7 
times the average poverty rate and only around 70 percent of average state and 
local revenue per pupil. These districts are both in an area south of the city that is 
home to several high-poverty school districts. Among those high-poverty districts, 
however, state and local revenues and resulting current spending vary widely. One 
only needs to go a few miles to the west to find low-poverty and higher-spending 
elementary school districts. 
Percent free lunch
0 to 20%
21% to 40%
41% to 60%
61% to 80%
80% to 100%
Unified districts
Current spending per pupil
$5,791.00 - $7,000.00
$7,000.01 - $8,000.00
$8,000.01 - $9,000.00
$9,000.01 - $10,000.00
$10,000.01 - $11,000.00
$11,000.01 - $15,000.00
$15,000.01 - $23,917.00
FIGURE 10
Distribution of current spending for elementary school districts 
and low-income students by school in Arizona
Sources: Bureau of the Census; National Center for Education Statistics.
Glendale Elementary District
Alhambra Elementary District
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FIGURE 11
Distribution of current spending for elementary school districts and low-income students by school in Illinois
Percent free lunch
0 to 20%
21 to 40%
41 to 60%
61 to 80%
81 to 100%
Unified districts
Current spending per pupil
$6286 - 8000
$8001 - 9000
$9001 - 10000
$10001 - 12000
$12001 - 14000
$14001 - 18000
$18001 - 27000
Sources: Bureau of the Census; National Center for Education Statistics.
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26 Center for American Progress | America’s Most Financially Disadvantaged School Districts and How They Got that Way
TABLE 7
Type 5. Shift happens
How demographic shifts are creating new patterns of funding inequity
Typology Exemplar states
Severely 
disadvantaged 
districts
Relative
poverty
Relative
revenue
Type 5.  
Shift happens
Illinois
Pennsylvania
Waukegan, IL
Aurora East, IL
Round Lake, IL
Reading, PA
Allentown, PA
2.175
1.416
1.966
2.316
2.454
0.786
0.782
0.769
0.795
0.777
Source: See Appendix A.
A seemingly peculiar finding regards the disparate racial distribution of fiscal 
disadvantage. Predominantly Hispanic school districts outside of major cities, 
including midsized and smaller cities and large towns, appear more frequently on 
the fiscally disadvantaged list. Is there something substantively different about 
the demography, local economics, and/or state aid of these communities in 
particular? This question warrants further exploration beyond the scope of this 
paper. They include Utica, New York; Reading and Allentown, Pennsylvania; 
and Waukegan, Illinois. They also include a number of population-dense cit-
ies, boroughs, and towns in otherwise progressively funded states such as 
New Jersey—Union City, West New York, Passaic, and New Brunswick—and 
Massachusetts—Everett, Lowell, and Revere. 
Figure 12 provides a statistical analysis of the relationship between racial composi-
tion and the likelihood of a district being classified as fiscally disadvantaged within 
any given state and labor market and being of similar geographic locale, be it 
urban, suburban, or rural. Figure 12 is based on a regression that also controls for 
the extent to which a district is dependent on state aid, sorting out the extent to 
which racial composition predicts fiscal disadvantage among districts that receive 
comparable shares of state aid. 
It shows that for every 1 percent increase in share of revenue from state aid, a 
district is 5.8 percent more likely to be identified as fiscally disadvantaged. That is, 
districts more dependent on state aid are more likely to be fiscally disadvantaged, 
which should come as no surprise. For every 1 percent increase in a district’s black 
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population, it is 1.8 percent more likely to be fiscally disadvantaged. For every 1 
percent increase in a district’s Hispanic population, it is 3.3 percent more likely 
to be fiscally disadvantaged. The likelihood of being fiscally disadvantaged also 
increased between the base year of 2009 and 2011. Districts were nearly 40 per-
cent more likely to be fiscally disadvantaged in 2010 than they were in 2009; they 
were 28 percent more likely to be fiscally disadvantaged in 2011 than they were in 
2009. Finally, suburban and town districts appear more likely than urban districts 
to be identified as fiscally disadvantaged, among unified K-12 districts that enroll 
more than 2,000 pupils. 
Figure 13 displays the relationship across Chicago-area school districts between 
the percent of the population that is Hispanic and the relative state and local 
revenue per pupil, with fiscally disadvantaged districts shaded orange. Waukegan, 
Aurora East, and Round Lake each have very high Hispanic population concentra-
tions and are among the most fiscally disadvantaged districts. 
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Table 3 shows the dynamics of property wealth change, operating levy change, and 
operating expenditures per pupil in the Chicago metropolitan area in the years 
leading up to the fiscal disadvantage measures constructed in this report. Districts 
that were majority Hispanic in 2003 are compared with those that were not, and 
figures are weighted by school district enrollments. Among those districts that 
were not majority Hispanic, 40 percent of students were enrolled in districts that 
were majority black. Most of the schools in this figure are Chicago Public Schools. 
Property wealth per pupil increased in both majority Hispanic and other districts in 
the Chicago metropolitan area but grew more slowly in majority Hispanic districts. 
As a result, these districts, which had 52 percent of the taxable property wealth of 
other districts in 2003, had only 45 percent of the wealth of other districts by 2009. 
As property wealth grew, property tax rates declined. But those rates declined more 
slowly in majority Hispanic districts, and as a result, while operating levies were 13 
percent higher in majority Hispanic districts in 2003, they were 25 percent higher 
in 2009. One might expect the increased gap in property tax rates to offset grow-
ing per-pupil spending gaps, but, as Table 3 shows, from 2003 to 2009, operating 
spending per pupil in majority Hispanic districts relative to other districts lost 
ground. In 2003, operating spending in majority Hispanic districts was 87 percent 
of other districts’ spending, and by 2009 that figure had declined to 82 percent. 
FIGURE 13
Relative state and local revenue and percent Hispanic in Chicago metro area
Source: See Appendix A. Student demographic data from the National Center for Education Statistics.
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While the causes of these disparities remain elusive and in need of further explora-
tion, including whether they are specifically related to Hispanic immigration pat-
terns, the disparities and their trends are quite clear. 
TABLE 8
Dynamics of taxable property wealth, tax rates,  
and operating spending for majority Hispanic districts in Illinois
Property wealth per pupil Operating levy (in percent) Operating expenditure per pupil
Year Other*
Majority
Hispanic**
Ratio Other
Majority
Hispanic
Ratio Other
Majority
Hispanic
Ratio
2003 $208,396 $108,193 52% 3.24 3.65 113% $9,065 $7,896 87%
2004 $228,764 $121,728 53% 3.11 3.68 118% $9,462 $8,289 88%
2005 $241,316 $124,675 52% 3.00 3.64 121% $9,701 $8,604 89%
2006 $261,704 $128,270 49% 2.96 3.62 122% $10,202 $9,004 88%
2007 $288,442 $145,957 51% 2.88 3.46 120% $10,745 $9,249 86%
2008 $310,062 $146,679 47% 2.81 3.49 124% $11,280 $9,629 85%
2009 $341,365 $153,429 45% 2.70 3.37 125% $12,187 $9,974 82%
Percent 
change
64% 42% -17% -8% 34% 26%
* “Other” includes 34 majority black districts enrolling approximately 40 percent of students not in majority Hispanic districts in the Chicago metro area. 
** Includes 11 districts. Hispanic enrollment increased from 21 percent to about 25.5 percent in “other” districts, and from 66 percent to 77 percent in majority Hispanic districts. 
Sources: Property wealth and operating expenditure data from ILEARN, FS files (FS0203.xls – FS0809.xls) available for year-by-year download at Illinois State Board of Education, “ILEARN,” available at 
http://webprod1.isbe.net/ilearn/ASP/index.asp (last accessed March 2014); Percent Hispanic from Illinois State Board of Education, “Fall Enrollment Counts: District Summary Files,” available at http://
www.isbe.state.il.us/research/htmls/fall_housing.htm (last accessed March 2014). 
Finally, Table 4, which includes the entire commonwealth of Pennsylvania, sum-
marizes the seven-year trends in Pennsylvania for majority Hispanic districts 
versus others. The only sizable majority Hispanic districts in 2004 were Allentown 
and Reading, which began at an average of 58 percent and grew to 70 percent over 
the period. By 2009, Lebanon also became majority Hispanic in this timeframe. 
As with majority Hispanic districts in the Chicago metropolitan area, property 
wealth, or market value, per pupil in average daily membership stagnated, while 
property wealth statewide climbed. 
As a result, taxable property wealth in majority Hispanic districts fell behind, 
starting at 48 percent of other districts’ average and ending at only 35 percent. Tax 
rates and expenditure trends during this period absorbed the effects of short-term 
state aid increases under then-Gov. Ed Rendell’s (D-PA) education plan, a short-
lived state school finance reform that would have infused substantial additional aid 
into higher-need, lower-wealth districts such as Allentown and Reading. As that 
aid was infused from 2009 to 2010, mill levies—local property tax rates that are 
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expressed in 1/1000s of taxable assessed property wealth—dropped, and per-
pupil spending gained some ground. But mill levies remain higher in Allentown 
and Reading than in other districts; per-pupil spending is also still much lower. As 
state support plummets in the future, stagnant property wealth will take its toll. 
TABLE 9
Dynamics of taxable property wealth, tax rates,  
and operating spending for majority Hispanic districts in Pennsylvania
Market value per ADM Mill levy (1/1000) Expenditures per pupil
Year Other
Majority 
Hispanic*
Ratio Other
Majority 
Hispanic
Ratio Other
Majority 
Hispanic
Ratio
2004 $239,118 $115,394 48.3% 21.96 27.30 124.3% $10,333 $7,883 76.3%
2005 $260,301 $117,700 45.2% 21.50 26.97 125.5% $10,900 $8,525 78.2%
2006 $266,393 $115,652 43.4% 22.41 27.67 123.5% $11,544 $8,808 76.3%
2007 $293,071 $120,873 41.2% 20.84 25.18 120.8% $12,113 $9,243 76.3%
2008 $300,143 $122,266 40.7% 21.29 24.70 116.0% $12,787 $9,902 77.4%
2009 $343,229 $137,772 40.1% 19.01 19.72 103.7% $13,197 $10,832 82.1%
2010 $353,216 $124,843 35.3% 19.18 20.81 108.5% $13,734 $11,635 84.7%
Percent 
change
48% 8% -13% -24% 33% 48%
* Includes three districts, including Allentown, Reading, and nonoperating Bryn Athyn. Hispanic enrollment increased from 5 percent to about 7 percent in “other” districts and from 58 percent to 70 
percent in majority Hispanic districts. 
Source: Market value and mill levy data available at Pennsylvania Department of Education, “Financial Data Elements,” available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/finan-
cial_data_elements/7672 (last accessed March 2014). Market values under “Aid Ratios Files” and mill rates under “Miscellaneous.” Per-pupil spending data from Pennsylvania Department of Education, 
available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/http;//www.portal.state.pa.us;80/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_123706_1335925_0_0_18/Finances%20AFR%20ExpDetail%200102-1112.xlsx.
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Policy recommendations
Findings in this report highlight that financially disadvantaged local public school 
districts exist in both states with perceived progressively financed state school 
finance systems and in states with highly regressive state school finance systems. 
Certainly, the latter are more common, with Illinois and Pennsylvania providing 
some of the most egregious cases. If nothing else, the eclectic mix of high-poverty 
school districts discussed herein and scattered across the American landscape raises 
serious concerns about the lack of a cohesive systematic approach to financing the 
country’s public education. Quite simply, it’s a mess, and many schools and districts 
that serve very high-need student populations are falling through the cracks. 
In Illinois, more than a quarter of students attend districts with low funding and 
high poverty, while many other children attend highly segregated, affluent, and 
predominantly white school districts flush with resources. Huge disparities persist 
in Michigan partly because of the design of school finance reforms adopted in the 
1990s that allocated state resources more flatly but failed to substantively reduce 
the reliance on local property taxes. These problems know no political boundar-
ies, and while they are significantly rooted in the failures of state school finance 
formulas, they are not uniformly so. The problems are deeper, more complex, and 
seemingly intractable. The path forward must begin by addressing at least the fol-
lowing four major issues.  
Organizational concerns: Boundaries and segregation
Our public school districts remain highly geographically, demographically, and 
economically segregated. High-poverty schools remain concentrated in high-
poverty districts that often have less access to local revenue-raising power. In 
many cases, densely populated major metropolitan areas such as Chicago, as well 
as the states of New Jersey and Connecticut, are home to inefficiently small local 
public school districts that remain separate governance units largely because of 
economic, racial, and ethnic differences with their nearest neighbors. Voluntary 
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consolidation policies are unlikely to increase integration, for which agreement by 
all parties is required. Notably, even when the state of Missouri in 2013 closed the 
100 percent low-income and minority district of Wellston, its remaining students 
were absorbed not by nearby affluent districts but rather by other comparably 
poor and minority districts. Only a few years earlier, the state passed a special law 
permitting the remaining predominantly white corner of Kansas City to vote itself 
out of the predominantly minority Kansas City Public Schools district and into 
the neighboring predominantly white Independence Public Schools district.18 
The strong influence of racial and economic housing segregation on severe fiscal 
disadvantage can be seen in several cases presented herein, including in the cities 
of Philadelphia and Chicago and among their suburbs. While these locales are 
illustrative of historically more common urban, black-white disparities, this report 
also reveals an emerging school funding problem facing communities increasingly 
populated by Hispanics, the economic causes of which require further investi-
gation. But as long as our local public school districts are allowed to remain so 
racially and economically segregated, leveraging state school finance policies to 
help solve achievement gaps will be an uphill climb. Past housing policies were 
part of the problem,19 and future housing policies need to be part of the solution. 
State policy leverage over local fiscal decisions
The importance of relative spending illuminates concerns over the intractable 
school finance problem of raising the absolute level of spending through state aid 
to needy districts. Such spending may be immediately offset if neighboring afflu-
ent suburbs choose to ratchet up their spending to continue outpacing their less-
advantaged, more aid-dependent peers. One might argue that students attending 
fiscally disadvantaged districts in a labor market with higher absolute spending are 
still better off in the broader national context. For example, even if children attend-
ing New York City schools have fewer resources than children from the Scarsdale 
or Long Island districts, they are better positioned than children attending public 
schools in Alabama and Mississippi. These larger disparities are certainly cause for 
concern, but patterns of graduate mobility and teacher sorting continue to operate 
largely at the local and regional levels. 
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The cases presented in this report reveal the limited power of state school finance 
systems to resolve inequities in funding across local districts. Local district and 
municipal taxing and spending decisions can—and, in many cases, do—under-
mine state school finance policy objectives. In some cases, local decisions under-
mine equity at the high end of the distribution—in affluent, leafy suburbs—and 
in other cases, they undermine it at the low end—in poorly funded cities such as 
Bridgeport, Connecticut. 
A delicate balance exists in regulating local taxing and spending decisions through 
state policy. Reasonably imposed tax and expenditure limits may be used to regu-
late interdistrict equity. But states should not, as New York and others have done, 
impose limits that reinforce and codify disparities, limiting local revenue growth 
at a fixed, inequitable point while disproportionately reducing state aid to higher-
need districts. Furthermore, as explained in the previously mentioned CAP report 
on stealth inequalities, New York state actually subsidizes the suburban spending 
race by providing disproportionate property tax relief to its most affluent districts. 
At the low end of the distribution, states must have some authority to ensure that 
local public school districts raise—and allocate to their schools—the local share 
of funding necessary to achieve overall adequate resources. In Texas, where the 
constitution prohibits state imposition of statewide property taxation, courts have 
accepted the state’s authority to establish a uniform statewide minimum tax rate 
to support the foundation formula as long as that statewide minimum permits 
“meaningful discretion”20 above and beyond the minimum. Even in states where 
many local public school districts operate under municipal governance, states 
must have available tools sufficient to ensure that municipalities provide appropri-
ate resources for their schools. 
More-nuanced measures of local  
capacity and need in state aid formulas
The cases explored herein reveal some additional complexities to the econom-
ics and demography of local public school districts, which likely require a closer 
look to determine the best methods for combining state aid and local revenues to 
achieve and maintain overall adequate spending. Both predominantly and emerg-
ing Hispanic communities such as Round Lake, Waukegan, and Reading—along 
with residential inner-urban fringe and small-city communities, such as Reading, 
Allentown, and Waukegan—appear to lack local revenue-raising capacity more 
than larger urban centers such as Philadelphia and Chicago. State aid and existing 
local effort requirements are failing to make up the difference. 
34 Center for American Progress | America’s Most Financially Disadvantaged School Districts and How They Got that Way
School finance literature from the 1990s provides useful insights into possible 
solutions, including regional or statewide sharing of property tax revenues derived 
from commercial and industrial properties.21 Such policies could substantively 
improve equity in both taxation and revenue raising across communities that have 
disparate access to nonresidential tax bases without the need for them to raise and 
spend additional state aid. 
Such policies could also substantively change the governance of the local property 
tax by decomposing the local property tax base, shifting commercial and industrial 
property taxation to the state while retaining local residential property taxation. 
Shifting control over components of local tax bases also clarifies the state’s role in 
promoting and encouraging thoughtful, equitable distribution of commercial and 
industrial economic development.22 
Illogical state aid programs: Stealth inequalities
Finally, states must take a hard look at plainly illogical state school finance for-
mula components, including but not limited to stealth inequalities. Michigan and 
Arizona must revisit their general state aid formulas in order to allocate more of 
their existing aid to districts with greater needs. This will mean allocating less aid 
to districts with fewer needs. This may mean taking on long-protected special aid 
programs, such as property tax relief programs or “outside the formula” grants, 
and allocating these funds more fairly. Alternatively, at the very least, any new aid 
in future years must be allocated through those parts of the formula that most 
improve, rather than erode, equity. 
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The way forward:  
Balancing compensatory  
and disruptive policies
As the economy has appeared to be slowly rebounding, interest has re-emerged 
in support of more traditional and more thoroughly researched strategies for 
improving the educational opportunities of low-income children. Specifically, 
the recently released report from the Equity and Excellence Commission, “For 
Each and Every Child,”23 laid out five priorities to guide education policymaking, 
including equitable school funding; improving the quality of teachers, administra-
tors, and curricula; and expanding early childhood education. 
The commission’s first major recommendation focused specifically on state school 
finance policies: 
The time has come for bold action by the states—and the federal government—
to redesign and reform the funding of our nation’s public schools. Achieving 
equity and excellence requires sufficient resources that are distributed based on 
student need, not zip code, and that are efficiently used. …
Accordingly, this commission believes the time has come for bold action by the 
states—and the federal government—to redesign and reform the funding of 
our nation’s public schools. The deep inequities in school funding documented 
by another federal commission more than 40 years ago … remain entrenched 
across our nation’s states and school districts at a time when more than 40 
percent of all American public school children are enrolled in districts of concen-
trated student poverty.24
Addressing just one of these major issues would not be easy, and addressing all 
four of them seems almost impossible. But they are—and likely will continue for 
the foreseeable future to be—the most persistent underlying causes of inequity in 
America’s educational system. It is in our national interest to answer them thor-
oughly, consistently, and sooner rather than later.
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Appendix A:  
Methodological appendix
To identify individual districts whose resources are inequitable, this report gener-
ally applies the following two filters: 
• State and local revenue per pupil from the U.S. Census Bureau Fiscal Survey’s 
three-year average, which is less than the average for districts in the same labor 
market25*
• Adjusted Census poverty rates for 5- to 17-year-olds from the Census Small 
Area Income and Poverty Estimates’ three-year average26—that is greater than 
the average for districts in the same labor market
* Where labor market is defined as it is in the National Center for Education 
Statistics Education Comparable Wage Index—as, essentially, a core-based, statis-
tical area for all districts in metropolitan or micropolitan areas.27
In order to identify fiscally disadvantaged school districts, this report refers to a 
three-year panel of data that combines the U.S. Census Bureau’s Fiscal Survey of 
Local Governments 2009-2011 with the U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Income 
and Poverty Estimates, or SAIPE, which provides annually updated estimates of 
the percentages of school-aged children in families living below the federal income 
threshold for poverty. It also uses data from the National Center for Education 
Statistics that identify the labor market within which each local public school 
district is located and the locale codes for those districts. Labor markets herein 
are defined as in the development of the National Center for Education Statistics 
Education Comparable Wage Index, and essentially represent metropolitan 
statistical areas, micropolitan statistical areas, or rural areas. These classifications 
are based on the U.S. Census Bureau Core Based Statistical Area classifications. 
Locale codes are used for identifying city, suburban, and town districts. 
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By comparing local public school districts’ poverty rates and expenditures to 
other districts in the same labor markets, the analysis effectively controls for the 
differing value of the education dollar across broad regions and more local labor 
markets. Furthermore, this approach also effectively controls for the insensitivity 
of poverty income thresholds across labor markets. That is, poverty rates of each 
local public school district are compared only to poverty rates of other districts in 
their immediate surroundings.28 
The empirical strategy for identifying fiscally disadvantaged districts herein is 
relatively straightforward. The first step was to estimate the average state and local 
revenue per pupil for all districts in each labor market within the same year. The 
focus was on state and local revenues per pupil because these figures captured 
the full influence of state and local policy and set aside all federal revenues except 
impact aid, which serves as a replacement for lost local revenues. The next step 
was to estimate the average poverty rate across all districts in each labor market. 
After that, the strategy called for taking each district’s state and local revenues and 
dividing them by, or expressing them as a ratio to, the labor-market average; the 
same was done for each district’s poverty rate with respect to labor-market aver-
ages. A fiscally disadvantaged district is one in which the state and local revenue 
per pupil is lower than the labor-market average while the child poverty rate is 
higher than the labor-market average. To achieve a manageable list of school dis-
tricts for further exploration, somewhat arbitrary cutoffs were applied. 
Fiscally disadvantaged =
State and local revenue per pupil < 90 percent labor-market average
and
U.S. Census poverty rate > 125 percent labor-market average
Only those districts enrolling at least 2,000 pupils were considered, as these are 
the districts that should be able to operate with efficiency of scale. Nonrural 
districts were given particular attention. These districts are in either metropolitan 
areas—based around a population hub of 50,000 or more residents—or micro-
politan areas—based around population hub of 10,000 to 50,000 residents. 
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General findings by state
Table B1 summarizes the number of districts, their total enrollments, and enroll-
ments as a share of statewide enrollment. Illinois is home to the largest share of 
children attending fiscally disadvantaged school districts. Notably, a large share of 
these children attend a single school district—Chicago Public Schools. The case 
is similar in Pennsylvania, where the School District of Philadelphia is among 
the state’s most fiscally disadvantaged. Perhaps surprisingly, it is not generally the 
case that the largest urban districts are most likely to be fiscally disadvantaged as 
empirically identified herein. Like Philadelphia and Chicago, New York City also 
appears below average in state and local revenues per pupil relative to its labor 
market, as well as higher in poverty, but to a lesser degree. 
Other generally inequitable states such as New Hampshire also make the list, as 
they have high shares of children in fiscally disadvantaged districts. Two very low 
average spending states, Arizona and Utah, also have significant shares of children 
attending some even less well-funded, high-poverty districts. The relatively high 
spending and progressively funded—higher funding in higher-poverty districts—
states of New Jersey and Massachusetts are surprisingly high on the list, revealing 
irregularities in their funding that selectively disadvantage certain districts. Other 
New England states, including Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont, are also 
relatively high on the list. 
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TABLE B1
Percent of enrolled children attending fiscally disadvantaged districts by 
state, 2010-11
State Total enrollment
Fiscally  
disadvantaged
Total  
districts
Fiscally  
disadvantaged
Percent of  
enrollment
Fairness 
ratio
Illinois 2,074,286 531,854 844 42 25.60% 0.81
New Hampshire 193,262 34,407 170 18 17.80% 0.77
Pennsylvania 1,674,152 246,980 498 18 14.80% 0.91
Utah 511,682 70,087 40 1 13.70% 1.24
Connecticut 544,586 73,870 166 8 13.60% 1.03
Vermont 91,128 10,630 269 32 11.70% 0.78
Arizona 945,003 109,555 216 18 11.60% 0.96
Rhode Island 148,356 16,049 36 2 10.80% 0.96
New Jersey 1,471,312 127,334 549 21 8.70% 1.07
Montana 140,751 9,804 411 22 7.00% 1.02
Wyoming 88,165 5,394 48 3 6.10% 0.95
Maine 141,408 7,947 191 11 5.60% 0.94
Massachusetts 947,801 50,455 294 8 5.30% 1.13
Missouri 892,054 44,047 520 27 4.90% 0.94
North Dakota 93,042 4,495 172 6 4.80% 0.78
Michigan 1,455,965 64,353 549 35 4.40% 0.95
Texas 4,796,368 196,685 1,028 37 4.10% 0.88
Colorado 835,589 33,024 178 7 4.00% 0.96
California 6,006,435 224,609 937 45 3.70% 1.09
Ohio 1,719,744 62,538 614 22 3.60% 1.20
South Carolina 702,715 22,396 82 6 3.20% 1.03
Nebraska 293,333 8,216 239 5 2.80% 0.93
Kentucky 672,955 16,292 174 9 2.40% 1.10
Washington 1,042,980 20,992 295 8 2.00% 0.97
Alaska 131,703 2,538 53 2 1.90% 1.98
Kansas 477,839 7,948 277 1 1.70% 0.99
New York 2,792,345 47,902 681 11 1.70% 0.84
Virginia 1,251,311 21,187 134 6 1.70% 0.95
Oklahoma 660,966 10,842 521 15 1.60% 1.04
Alabama 745,234 10,704 131 4 1.40% 0.92
Mississippi 489,485 6,819 149 4 1.40% 0.95
Louisiana 651,860 8,733 68 2 1.30% 1.21
West Virginia 282,128 3,605 55 2 1.30% 1.04
Idaho 264,398 3,230 113 3 1.20% 0.89
Georgia 1,676,340 17,904 180 4 1.10% 1.13
North Carolina 1,448,119 13,892 115 3 1.00% 0.71
Tennessee 986,386 9,774 135 5 1.00% 1.10
Minnesota 794,216 7,299 333 6 0.90% 1.28
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State Total enrollment
Fiscally  
disadvantaged
Total  
districts
Fiscally  
disadvantaged
Percent of  
enrollment
Fairness 
ratio
Arkansas 473,660 2,384 237 3 0.50% 1.07
Florida 2,636,410 13,088 67 2 0.50% 1.05
Iowa 491,006 1,237 350 1 0.30% 0.92
South Dakota 123,667 275 147 1 0.20% 1.27
Wisconsin 861,542 1,857 420 3 0.20% 0.99
Oregon 568,971 636 194 1 0.10% 1.02
Delaware 113,078 0 16 0 0.00% 1.00
Indiana 1,023,548 0 290 0 0.00% 1.14
Maryland 851,976 0 24 0 0.00% 0.90
Nevada 429,606 0 17 0 0.00% 0.69
New Mexico 331,374 0 89 0 0.00% 1.07
Sources: Fiscally disadvantaged districts identified as explained throughout this report, using a three-year panel of data combining measures from the Census Bureau Fiscal Surveys on school district 
revenues (school district level: http://www.census.gov/govs/school/), NCES Common Core of Data on school district demographics and enrollments (district level data: http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/
pubagency.asp and school level data: http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/pubschuniv.asp), and labor-market classifications based on the NCES wage index (district level data linked to labor-market classifica-
tions: http://bush.tamu.edu/research/faculty/Taylor_CWI/). Funding fairness ratios from Bruce D. Baker, David Sciarra, and Danielle Farrie, “Is School Funding Fair? A National Report Card” (Newark, NJ: 
Education Law Center, 2012), available at http://www.schoolfundingfairness.org/National_Report_Card_2012.pdf.
Figure B1 compares the 
shares of children in fiscally 
disadvantaged districts to 
the relative progressiveness 
of the state school finance 
system as a whole. Notably, 
more regressive states such 
as Illinois, Pennsylvania, and 
New Hampshire have larger 
shares of children attending 
fiscally disadvantaged districts. 
But marginally progressive 
states such as Connecticut, 
as well as more progressive 
states such as New Jersey and 
Massachusetts, have notice-
able shares of children in 
fiscally disadvantaged districts 
as well. Utah presents an 
awkward case where overall 
spending is extremely low. 
While higher-poverty districts in the state have, on average, higher spending than 
lower-poverty districts, neither type has very much. 
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Source: Data from Table B1.
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Cities’ revenue gaps
State, district
Relative  
revenue 
 Relative  
poverty 
 GAP 
Arizona, Sunnyside Unified School District 0.800  1.646  0.846 
California, Compton Unified School District 0.867  1.347  0.480 
California, Hayward Unified School District 0.874  1.319  0.445 
Colorado, Greeley-Evans School District 6 0.891  1.326  0.435 
Connecticut, Bridgeport Public School District 0.802  2.618  1.817 
Connecticut, Danbury Public School District 0.748  1.439  0.691 
Connecticut, East Hartford Public School District 0.877  1.668  0.790 
Illinois, Chicago Public School District 0.868  1.660  0.792 
Michigan, Godfrey-Lee Public School District 0.882  1.899  1.017 
Michigan, Niles Community School District 0.810  1.286  0.476 
New Hampshire, Manchester School District 0.816  1.866  1.050 
New Jersey, New Brunswick Public School District 0.855  3.097  2.242 
New York, Lansingburgh Central School District 0.888  1.889  1.001 
New York, Utica City School District 0.836  1.826  0.990 
Ohio, Elyria City School District 0.855  1.423  0.567 
Pennsylvania, Allentown City School District 0.777  2.454  1.677 
Pennsylvania, Lebanon School District 0.882  2.178  1.297 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia City School District 0.879  2.131  1.252 
Pennsylvania, Reading School District 0.795  2.316  1.521 
Texas, Bryan Independent School District 0.775  1.250  0.474 
Texas, Irving Independent School District 0.891  1.478  0.587 
Texas, San Antonio Independent School District 0.880  1.719  0.839 
Source: See Appendix A.
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Suburbs’ revenue gaps
State, district
 Relative 
revenue 
 Relative 
poverty 
 GAP 
Alabama, Bessemer City School District 0.885  2.178  1.293 
Alabama, Fairfield City School District 0.879  1.556  0.677 
Arizona, Flowing Wells Unified School District 0.875  1.323  0.448 
California, Gilroy Unified School District 0.883  1.269  0.387 
California, Ravenswood City School District 0.795  1.725  0.931 
Colorado, Mapleton Public School District 0.848  1.466  0.618 
Connecticut, New Britain School District 0.895  2.437  1.542 
Connecticut, Waterbury Public School District 0.885  1.804  0.919 
Illinois, East Aurora School District 0.782  1.416  0.634 
Illinois, Collinsville Community Unit School District 10 0.869  1.323  0.455 
Illinois, Granite City Community Unit School District 9 0.870  1.472  0.602 
Illinois, North Chicago Community Unit School District 187 0.868  2.374  1.506 
Illinois, Round Lake Area School District 116 0.769  1.966  1.197 
Illinois, Waukegan Public School District 60 0.786  2.175  1.389 
Kentucky, Erlanger-Elsmere School District 0.859  1.595  0.736 
Louisiana, St. Bernard Parish Public School District 0.872  1.290  0.419 
Massachusetts, Brockton Public School District 0.821  1.353  0.532 
Massachusetts, East Bridgewater Public School District 0.890  1.342  0.451 
Massachusetts, Everett Public School District 0.820  2.252  1.432 
Massachusetts, Lowell Public School District 0.856  2.294  1.438 
Massachusetts, Revere Public School District 0.815  1.748  0.933 
Michigan, Clintondale Community School District 0.869  1.906  1.037 
Michigan, East Detroit Public School District 0.876  2.062  1.186 
Michigan, Hamtramck Public School District 0.803  2.099  1.296 
Michigan, Inkster Public School District 0.864  1.607  0.743 
Michigan, Mt. Morris Consolidated School District 0.872  1.383  0.511 
Michigan, Port Huron Area School District 0.776  1.708  0.932 
Michigan, Westwood Community School District 0.891  1.282  0.391 
Missouri, Belton School District 0.862  1.315  0.452 
Missouri, Jennings School District 0.833  2.236  1.404 
Missouri, Riverview Gardens School District 0.848  2.132  1.283 
New Hampshire, Rochester School District 0.829  1.842  1.013 
New Jersey, Belleville School District 0.771  1.262  0.490 
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State, district
 Relative 
revenue 
 Relative 
poverty 
 GAP 
New Jersey, Carteret School District 0.854  1.789  0.935 
New Jersey, Dover Public School District 0.787  1.601  0.814 
New Jersey, Irvington Public School District 0.846  2.061  1.215 
New Jersey, Passaic School District 0.831  1.478  0.647 
New Jersey, Paterson School District 0.761  1.388  0.627 
New Jersey, Plainfield Public School District 0.864  1.720  0.857 
New Jersey, Union City School District 0.794  1.354  0.560 
New Jersey, West New York School District 0.741  1.289  0.547 
New York, Brentwood Union Free School District 0.815  2.154  1.339 
North Carolina, Kannapolis City School District 0.774  1.487  0.714 
Ohio, Fairborn City School District 0.798  1.316  0.518 
Ohio, Groveport Madison Local School District 0.890  1.350  0.460 
Ohio, Hamilton City School District 0.858  1.544  0.687 
Ohio, Hamilton Local School District 0.649  1.318  0.668 
Ohio, Painesville City Local School District 0.801  1.631  0.829 
Ohio, Struthers City School District 0.861  1.266  0.405 
Pennsylvania, Belle Vernon Area School District 0.819  1.269  0.450 
Pennsylvania, Connellsville Area School District 0.872  1.994  1.122 
Pennsylvania, Greater Nanticoke Area School District 0.868  1.320  0.452 
Pennsylvania, Highlands School District 0.887  1.548  0.661 
Pennsylvania, Laurel Highlands School District 0.818  1.480  0.663 
Pennsylvania, Uniontown Area School District 0.867  2.003  1.136 
Rhode Island, Pawtucket School District 0.785  1.619  0.835 
Rhode Island, Woonsocket School District 0.776  2.035  1.259 
South Carolina, Lexington School District 0.824  1.324  0.499 
Texas, Duncanville Independent School District 0.861  1.285  0.423 
Texas, Grand Prairie Independent School District 0.878  1.251  0.373 
Utah, Granite School District 0.868  1.245  0.377 
Virginia, Fredericksburg City Public School District 0.763  2.140  1.377 
Virginia, Manassas Park City Public School District 0.803  1.276  0.473 
Washington, Clarkston School District School District 0.855  1.278  0.424 
Washington, Franklin Pierce School District 0.882  1.529  0.647 
Source: See Appendix A.
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Towns’ revenue gaps
State, district
 Relative 
revenue 
 Relative 
poverty 
 GAP 
 Arizona, Page Unified School District 8  0.806  1.265  0.459 
 Arizona, Whiteriver Unified School District 20  0.795  1.344  0.549 
 California, Calexico Unified School District  0.878  1.298  0.420 
 Colorado, Montezuma-Cortez School District Re-1  0.813  1.313  0.500 
 Connecticut, Windham Public School District  0.894  2.032  1.139 
 Florida, Okeechobee County School District  0.877  1.329  0.452 
 Georgia, Griffin-Spalding County School District  0.893  1.434  0.541 
 Kansas, Geary County Schools USD 475  0.874  1.536  0.662 
 Kentucky, Bardstown City School District  0.788  1.385  0.597 
 Maine, Sanford School Department  0.602  1.369  0.768 
 Michigan, Imlay City Community School District  0.782  1.262  0.480 
 Michigan, Ionia Public School District  0.895  1.587  0.693 
 Minnesota, Hibbing Public School District  0.871  1.582  0.711 
 Mississippi, Clarksdale Municipal School District  0.884  1.298  0.414 
 Missouri, Potosi R-III School District  0.693  2.141  1.447 
 Missouri, Sedalia 200 School District  0.876  1.276  0.401 
 Nebraska, Hastings Public School District  0.822  1.417  0.595 
 Nebraska, Scottsbluff Public School District  0.852  1.303  0.451 
 New Hampshire, Claremont School District  0.821  1.272  0.451 
 New Hampshire, Laconia School District  0.799  1.288  0.489 
 New York, Jamestown School District  0.851  1.322  0.471 
 New York, Malone Central School District  0.858  1.425  0.568 
 New York, Olean City School District  0.821  1.270  0.449 
 North Carolina, Asheboro City School District  0.785  1.380  0.595 
 Ohio, Alliance City School District  0.883  1.654  0.771 
 Ohio, Celina City School District  0.874  1.407  0.533 
 Pennsylvania, Mifflin County School District  0.894  1.341  0.447 
 South Carolina, Marion County School District  0.826  1.411  0.585 
 Texas, Gonzales Independent School District  0.847  1.293  0.446 
 Texas, Hereford Independent School District  0.627  1.298  0.671 
 Texas, Jacksonville Independent School District  0.717  1.267  0.550 
 Texas, Mexia Independent School District  0.721  1.282  0.560 
 Texas, Pecos-Barstow-Toyah Independent School District  0.583  1.526  0.943 
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State, district
 Relative 
revenue 
 Relative 
poverty 
 GAP 
 Virginia, Shenandoah County Public School District  0.895  1.279  0.383 
 Virginia, Warren County Public School District  0.623  1.306  0.683 
 Washington, Centralia School District 401  0.878  1.267  0.388 
 Washington, Omak School District  0.845  1.347  0.503 
 Wyoming, Fremont County School District  0.785  1.546  0.761 
 Wyoming, Park County School District  0.876  1.355  0.479 
Source: See Appendix A.
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